From the Arab Spring that Zanu PF narrowly avoided to the 2017 military coup in Zimbabwe and the recent military coup in Myanmar, one common thread remains constant—the pivotal role played by chief justices presiding over compromised judiciaries in legitimizing undemocratic transfers of power. In Zimbabwe, this trend continues to unfold, with Chief Justice Malaba at the center of controversy. This article sheds light on why President Mnangagwa values a captured judiciary under Malaba’s influence over military support, and how the opposition can strategically counter this move.

Chief justices wield immense power, determining not only who occupies the highest office in the land but also the fate of that occupancy. This is particularly critical in cases of illegal power transitions, as seen in Zimbabwe in 2017 when Mnangagwa sought legitimacy from the captured, militarized judiciary after lacking the consent of the people. While this legitimacy may be less potent than the one derived from popular support, it shields factions and sectional interests aligned with the judiciary, providing a semblance of authority.

Malaba’s career as a Mnangagwa loyalist is on the wane, but both he and his master are determined to secure Mnangagwa’s stay in power for various reasons. Without a judiciary sympathetic to Mnangagwa, he could not only lose power but also face political persecution and the loss of ill-gotten wealth. To safeguard his position, Mnangagwa plans to amend the supreme law of the land, exploiting the pandemic to enable unchecked constitutional changes favoring Zanu PF’s centralization of power. Public input has been sidelined, ensuring swift approval of amendments in a Zanu PF-dominated parliament.

Such amendments serve as a precursor to Mnangagwa’s ultimate objective: remaining in power at any cost. However, the resilient opposition, driven by the pursuit of good governance, stands ready to thwart this ambition. Mnangagwa’s fears of losing power, either through impeachment or a military coup orchestrated by factions aligned with Vice President Chiwenga, drive his need for a loyal and reliable judiciary.

A compromised judiciary ensures that any power transition unfavorable to Mnangagwa attracts negative international attention, potential military intervention, or economic sanctions. Mnangagwa emerges as the victor, effectively neutralizing ambitious factions. Extending Malaba’s tenure becomes a strategic move to consolidate power.

To achieve this, Mnangagwa would likely amend the constitution, removing presidential term limits to guarantee his continued rule. Malaba’s role in this scenario would be crucial in legitimizing the amendment and ensuring Mnangagwa’s indefinite stay in power.

With an amended constitution allowing unlimited terms for Mnangagwa, the military would lose grounds for removing him on constitutional grounds, as the judiciary would have endorsed the illegal amendment. The opposition must adopt a strategic approach—divide and conquer—to prevent these amendments and safeguard the constitution from further devaluation.

In collaboration with factions opposing Mnangagwa, notably the Chiwenga faction, the opposition can exploit parliamentary dominance to block these amendments and render Malaba’s appointment futile.

In summary, Mnangagwa’s fears of accountability and transparency haunt him as he seeks to remain in power. His quest exposes his party to unintended consequences, but the opposition’s innovative responses and strategic collaborations can thwart his attempts and preserve Zimbabwe’s democratic principles. The chess game continues, and the outcome remains uncertain.